cryptopals

Matasano's cryptopals challenges (cryptopals.com).
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commit 3e69e92f046e2ed9dcdc18a2e91de7a605f3f63a
parent ad29fe190d65b857fcd4411d6f2b5ed583ea7081
Author: Jared Tobin <jared@jtobin.io>
Date:   Tue, 15 Aug 2023 18:35:54 -0230

Fix typo.

Diffstat:
Mdocs/s5.md | 10+++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/s5.md b/docs/s5.md @@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ b mod p = 1, as will the shared key from Alice's perspective (since 1 ^ a mod p = 1). Mallory thus needs to forward a 1 as Alice's public key in order for Bob to agree on the shared key. -For g = p, Bob computes B = p ^ b mod p = 0, so Mallory needs to forward -a 0 as Alice's public key in order for them to agree on the shared key. +For g = p, Bob computes B = p ^ b mod p = 0, so Mallory can forward a +p as Alice's public key in order for them to agree on the shared key. Finally, the case of g = p - 1. Note that for any p > 1 and any even b, we have (for appropriate coefficients a, c, etc.): @@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ probability 1/2 + 1/2 - 1/4 = 3/4. (Mallory could ensure the attack works every time by forwarding 1's for *both* public keys, but that seems against the spirit of the question.) -Here are the interleaved logs of a successful attack: +Here are the interleaved logs of a successful attack. Start mallory with +e.g. the `dhngmitm 1` or `dhngmitm p` protocol to perform this attack +with g = 1 or g = p, or use `dhngmitm'` for the g = p - 1 case: (cryptopals) bob: listening.. (cryptopals) mallory: LiSteNIng.. @@ -244,5 +246,3 @@ Here are the interleaved logs of a successful attack: (cryptopals) alice: decrypted ciphertext: "confirmed, attacking at 10pm" (cryptopals) mallory: ending session - -